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 Private Credit Markets in Paris,
 1690-1840
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN, GILLES POSTEL-VINAY, AND
 JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL
 Relying on a large sample of private and public loan contracts taken from Parisian
 notarial records, this article examines the private borrowers and lenders who
 participated in the credit market between 1690 and 1840. It explains the important
 role notaries played in the market, describes the types of loans available to
 borrowers and lenders, stresses the importance of the life cycle in explaining the
 recourse to indebtedness, and ends with a discussion of the difficulties lenders had
 in assessing creditworthiness.
 Barthelemy Francois Thoynard de Jouy and his wife were borrowing
 feverishly. In the space of eight years-from 1751 to 1758-the
 Parisian tax farmer (fermier general) and his spouse signed over 70 loan
 contracts totaling more than 810,000 livres, a tidy sum in an era when a
 local day laborer might earn little more than 200 livres a year. Precisely
 why they took on so much debt we cannot say, though the desperate
 scent of unpaid bills does waft over some of the records. More
 important than their personal saga, though, is the picture that their
 dealings paint of the Old Regime credit market. Thoynard de Jouy and
 his spouse indebted themselves, often repeatedly, to neighbors in their
 parish of Saint Eustache and to residents in other parts of the city-to
 nearly sixty creditors in all. They sought money both high and low.
 Among their creditors we find not only the nobles, officeholders,
 merchants, and fellow tax gatherers we would expect, but also numer-
 ous artisans and even a farmer's (laboureur's) widow. In an era before
 the existence of banks, the couple mobilized a surprisingly extensive
 network of lenders.1
 It would be tempting to write Thoynard de Jouy and his wife off as
 aberrations. After all, he possessed an important office (maitre de
 requests in the king's council), and one might assume that borrowing
 was peculiar to the couple's elevated social milieu or to the realm of tax
 gatherers and government financiers, in which personal debts were
 common. Certainly, few couples could pile up such a mountain of debt.
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 1 Archives Nationales, Minutier Central [henceforth AN MC], Etude 70 (1751-1758).
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 But credit, it turns out, was hardly confined to the rich and the
 influential or even to the world of government finance. In Paris, artisans
 both lent and borrowed. Outside the city, farmers went into debt to
 purchase livestock, and day laborers did so in times of dearth. Parents
 made loans to establish children and invested in life annuities to prepare
 for their old age. The state constantly sought loans in the credit market,
 and not simply from wealthy financiers. Credit assumed such impor-
 tance that, as one historian suggests, an eighteenth-century person's
 very reputation was bound up with his ability to obtain loans-
 something implied by the very word credit. In such a world, public
 insults had to be avenged, if only because they could destroy one's
 credit rating.2
 Obviously significant, the credit market of the Old Regime and the
 early nineteenth century deserves our attention, particularly if we are
 economic historians. After all, if it functioned well, it could have
 mobilized considerable savings for producers and goaded on economic
 growth while it smoothed over economic tragedies for consumers and
 resolved the difficulties of the life cycle. Because of the risks of default
 and the associated problem of asymmetric information, its workings
 ought to interest scholars of a theoretical bent, while those with a taste
 for politics could thrive by studying how the state entered it to borrow.
 It might also intrigue anthropologically minded historians, who could
 investigate how social and cultural institutions-a person's family, for
 example, or his neighborhood reputation-served to pass information
 from borrowers to lenders.
 Curiously, though, the credit market of the Old Regime and the early
 nineteenth century has never received its historical due. Indeed, despite
 a number of excellent studies devoted to particular aspects of the credit
 market, no one has examined the whole credit system, private and
 public, up and down the social scale, across the Revolution, and over a
 long period, as financial and political institutions changed. We propose
 to do so, starting with a large set of data from Paris. Our focus here will
 be the private parties active in the credit market and not the state.
 A DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH CREDIT SYSTEM
 Until the late nineteenth century credit markets in France were
 decentralized. The usual intermediaries were not banks but rather
 notaries, semipublic officials who drew up and certified private legal
 documents. Not only did notaries play a central role in the organization
 2 Brennan, Public Drinking and Popular Culture in Eighteenth-Century Paris, pp. 70-71. For
 works on credit in early modem Europe, see our working paper, "Private Credit Markets in Paris,
 1690-1840." It provides a more elaborate version of this article, with full references, a complete
 description of our sample, and discussions and statistical tests too lengthy to include here.
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 of credit markets, but their surviving archives provide the richest source
 of data for credit transactions before 1840.
 As in a number of other European countries, notaries in France had
 recorded wills, prenuptial agreements, estate papers, and financial
 contracts since the Middle Ages. Usually they made two versions of
 each act: an original, which went to one of the interested parties, and a
 copy, which the notary kept so that he or his successors could verify
 documents in cases of litigation. The number of notarial offices etudese)
 in which notaries carried out their business was regulated, but the
 etudes themselves were the private property of the notaries, who could
 sell them or bequeath them to their children. The value of an etude
 derived from the records the notary preserved and from the notary's
 clientele, who typically remained with the etude when it was trans-
 ferred.
 Often a notarial etude recorded a family's financial transactions for
 generations; as a result, notaries enjoyed unequaled access to informa-
 tion about the wealth and income of individuals. Because smoothly
 functioning credit markets required reliable estimates of wealth and
 income, notaries were ideally suited to mediate between borrowers and
 lenders. On behalf of lenders, they could locate borrowers with enough
 assets to seem creditworthy; for borrowers, they could use their lender
 clientele to mobilize funds on short notice. The notary of e'tude 115, for
 example, managed to find 312 lenders for the duke of Orleans in 1752
 and thereby helped him raise nearly one million livres in less than a
 year's time. It is worth noting here that the notaries were supposedly
 doing no more than matching borrowers and lenders: legally they were
 prohibited from providing full intermediation by borrowing from
 would-be lenders and relending to would-be borrowers. At least some
 notaries, though, did take money on deposit from lenders and lend it
 again out to borrowers.3 In any case, whether a notary was simply
 matching borrowers and lenders or serving as a true intermediary, he
 was unlikely to take advantage of his lenders because his future business
 and the value of his etude depended on his reputation for honesty.
 In Paris, notaries also helped mobilize capital for the state. On some
 occasions, in fact, the state raised funds by selling notaries the right to
 place a selected loan. Each notary then found lenders for his share of the
 loan, either directly or indirectly through a second tier of intermediaries.
 These second-tier intermediaries bought up to 250,000 livres of a loan in
 as many as 20 or 30 contracts, which they would later resell in Paris, in
 the provinces, or abroad.4
 Despite a great deal of innovation in public finance, Old Regime
 governments made little effort to liberalize private credit markets.
 3 Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, Ferme, entreprise, famille. Other examples suggest that true
 intermediation was in fact quite common.
 4 For an example, see AN MC, ftude 70 (Jan. 1760).
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 Indeed, prior to 1789 private loan contracts were severely limited.
 Merchants did utilize various letters of credit (billets, lettres de change),
 but most private borrowers could choose among only three different
 types of loans: life annuities (rentes viageres), perpetual annuities
 (rentes perpetuelles), and promissory notes (obligations). The limited
 number of contracts available resulted from both legal and informational
 constraints. To begin with, for religious and for political reasons, the
 state restricted both what sort of loan contracts could be drawn up and
 how high interest rates could be. Only the life and the perpetual
 annuities could contain explicit payments of interest, and the interest
 rate on the perpetual annuities could not exceed a certain maximum:
 usually 5 percent after the late seventeenth century. Furthermore, all
 perpetual annuity contracts had to permit the borrower to repay the loan
 at any time simply by reimbursing the capital. Repayment was solely his
 decision, however: the lender could not require it.5
 Many lenders were of course unwilling to surrender control of their
 capital for a lifetime or conceivably in perpetuity as the annuities
 required, and obviously many borrowers needed loans for briefer
 periods. In such instances, the lenders and borrowers resorted to other
 sorts of contracts, some-the notes known as obligations-drawn up
 before notaries and others merely signed by the parties and not recorded
 by a notary (billets). The obligations might cover loans lasting less than
 one year or they might be renewed for five or ten years. Repayment
 could be demanded by the lender on short notice, and they were
 ostensibly interest free. Yet while the contracts could not legally
 mention any interest due, it is nonetheless clear that interest was
 charged on the obligations-indeed, often at a rate above the limit on
 rentes.6
 The Revolution ushered in an era of important change in the French
 capital market. First, the revolutionary regimes removed public finance
 from the notaries' domain; thereafter, government loans were negoti-
 ated through banks. Second, they created a national land registry,
 through which collateral claims could be verified. And third, they
 withdrew the prohibition against lending at interest, although an interest
 The legal maximum interest rates on perpetual annuities did not apply to all social groups, and
 they varied from province to province and over time. Throughout much of France the maximum
 rate was 10 percent in the early sixteenth century, 8.33 percent under Charles IX, 6.25 percent
 under Henry IV, 5.55 percent under Louis XIII, and 5 percent for most of the period from 1665 to
 1789. See Guyot, Repertoire universal et raisonng dejurisprudence, s.v. "rentes" and "interets";
 and Isambert et al., Recuedi general des anciennes lois franfaises. Unlike government perpetual
 annuities, the private perpetuals were not discounted. As for the interest rates on private rentes
 viageres, they were identical to the rates on government viageres-a subject we take up in our
 working paper, "Private and Public Credit Markets in Paris."
 6 For evidence that interest was in fact paid on obligations, see Archives D1partementales du
 Rh6ne, 3 B 502 (Mar. 9, 1621); and Courderie, La dette des collectivites publiques, pp. 67-74. Each
 of the different loan types posed different risks in cases of interest rate changes, and each offered
 certain advantages to either the borrower or the lender.
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 rate maximum was reintroduced in 1807. As a result of these reforms,
 the embryonic banking system of the eighteenth century grew rapidly-
 though separately from notarial credit. The banks concentrated their
 efforts on loans to the government and on short-term commercial loans,
 whereas private individuals, industry, and agriculture continued to rely
 principally on notaries, especially for mid- or long-term credit.7 Notarial
 credit persisted, we would argue, because notaries could always draw
 on their unrivaled knowledge of wealth and income.
 THE PARIS SAMPLE
 To study how credit markets functioned in France between 1690 and
 1840, we began with Paris, where we collected data on over 8,000 loans.
 The data we gleaned from seven of the city's notarial etudes: numbers
 9, 21, 43, 62, 70, 78, and 115. Of the seven e'tudes, numbers 70 and 115
 were selected because they abounded in credit transactions. Etude 43
 drew our attention because its clientele came from Parisian neighbor-
 hoods that would otherwise be unrepresented in our sample and
 because its clients seemed refreshingly isolated from the circles of
 wealth, power, and high finance, affording us a glimpse of a somewhat
 different sort of borrower and lender. The four others were chosen at
 random. In many respects they were typical etudes, mixing rich and
 middling clients.
 For each etude, we collected a sample of private and public loan
 contracts for the period from 1690 through 1840-contracts representing
 new loans rather than stocks of outstanding debt. The data we gathered
 included-wherever possible-the date; the etude; the type of act; the
 capital and the interest; the planned duration and actual duration of the
 loan (repayment dates were often noted on the back of the original loan
 records); the profession, residence, sex, marital status, and age of both
 borrower and lender; family connections between the parties; and
 whether the borrower or the lender had been involved in other credit
 transactions. We also perused most documents concerning repayments,
 forced and voluntary contract revisions, and loan transfers (cessions),
 and we examined numerous probate inventories for records of credit
 transactions. The sample unfortunately overlooks letters of credit,
 which left hardly a trace in the notarial records, but it does catch the
 rentes, the viage'res, and the obligations-in other words, most mid-
 and long-term credit. To simplify matters here, we have omitted records
 from the troubled years of the Law affair in the early eighteenth century
 and from the tumultuous opening years of the Revolution. We thus
 7 Postel-Vinay, "La terre et I'argent"; and Gille, La banque et le credit en France.
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 restrict our attention to three periods of relative-though not perfect-
 financial calm: 1690 to 1710, 1730 to 1788, and 1807 to 1840.8
 If we consider the private individuals who participated in these loans
 and their dealings with one another-if, in other words, we temporarily
 ignore the greatest borrower of all, the state-then our sample reveals
 much about their credit transactions. Both borrowers and lenders came
 overwhelmingly from Paris itself. Some 90 percent of the borrowers and
 84 percent of lenders were Parisian, and another 8 percent of the former
 and 7 percent of the latter hailed from the city's suburbs or the
 surrounding countryside (the dcpartements of the Seine-et-Marne and
 the Seine-et-Oise, to be precise). Of the funds lent, 84 percent came
 from within the city's walls and 92 percent went to borrowers within
 Paris. At least as far as transactions between private parties were
 concerned, the Paris credit market did not therefore mobilize capital
 over vast distances.
 Both borrowers and lenders came disproportionately from the social
 elite. True, there were more modest borrowers such as Pierre Quiet, a
 wigmaker from the parish of Saint Paul, who received 2,000 livres from
 master wigmaker Benoit Caldero of the parish of Saint Gervais in 1751.
 But wigmakers were hardly paupers, and Quiet could in any case back
 up his loan with detailed collateral.9 Most parties to the loans, though,
 occupied more elevated rungs on the social ladder. If we restrict
 ourselves to the years from 1730 to 1788, when information on profes-
 sions is most illuminating, then 64 percent of the private borrowers were
 nobles and officers, whereas in Paris as a whole-to judge from
 Daumard and Furet's reading of marriage contracts in 1749-under 9
 percent of the city's lay adult population consisted of such members of
 the elite (Table 1). 10 The ranks of the borrowers reached to the very
 pinnacle of noble society to include figures such as the colossally
 wealthy Louis d'Orleans, who took on 5,100,000 livres of debt in the
 1750s, chiefly by selling life annuities. Also numerous among the
 borrowers were wealthy merchants, bourgeois de Paris, notaries, and
 financiers. The groups marked by their relative absence were those
 lower down the social ladder, such as artisans and day laborers.11 In
 1730 to 1788 only 10 percent of our borrowers were artisans (including
 8 Like any historical source, our sample is not perfect. Some of our notaries specialized in
 particular loans and particular clients, and even our years of calm include government financial
 crises-1770, for example. One might wonder, too, whether some of the quantities mentioned in
 the notarial documents were correct-for example, was the capital mentioned in the loans in fact
 the sum transferred to the borrower? Here, at least, diaries suggest that the notarial records were
 truthful: even in most obligations the capital in the notarial record was the actual cash handed over.
 We will deal with the other problems of our sample in future articles.
 9 AN MC, Etude 115 (Oct. 1751).
 10 The records from 1690 to 1710 oversample acts of state borrowing; hence they are excluded
 from much of what follows. The nineteenth-century records are omitted because the professional
 labels no longer tell much about a person's wealth.
 "Daumard and Furet, Structures et relations sociales, pp. 10-19.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 21:24:09 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Private Credit Markets in Paris, 1690-1840 299
 TABLE 1
 THE SOCIAL CLASS OF LENDERS AND BORROWERS (1730-1788)
 LENDERS (%)
 Nobles Paris
 & All Marriages
 Officers Church Trade Crafts Womena Borrowers (%)b
 BORROWERS % Valuec
 Nobles & officers Nd 46.0 6.9 29.8 7.2 10.0 63.6 1,055 8.6
 Ve 68.7 6.0 18.4 2.0 4.5 85.0 18,170
 Church N 35.5 6.4 33.8 11.3 12.9 3.7 62 0
 V 62.0 4.8 22.9 2.6 7.4 2.2 497
 Trade N 25.1 3.9 50.1 10.4 9.9 20.1 334 13.8
 V 35.1 3.4 49.9 5.5 5.4 8.4 1,777
 Crafts N 21.0 0.0 21.0 44.4 13.5 9.8 162 77.6
 V 38.4 0.0 17.1 17.5 6.8 2.6 567
 Women N 37.2 0.0 34.8 16.2 11.5 2.6 43 0
 V 68.5 0.0 14.9 11.0 5.5 1.1 181 0
 Total private N 38.7 5.4 33.4 11.8 10.4 45.7 1,656
 V 65.1 5.6 21.1 3.3 4.8 67.7 21,172
 State N 26.6 5.7 48.5 6.3 12.8 54.3 1,971
 V 54.2 9.0 26.9 3.2 4.6 32.3 10,107
 All N 32.1 5.6 41.7 8.9 11.7
 V 61.6 6.7 23.1 3.3 5.3
 All N 1,166 204 1,511 321 425 3,627
 Value' 19,269 2,103 7,202 1,036 1,669 31,279
 a Women here are all women who could not be classified in a social group. Thus this group contains
 mostly spinsters and widows.
 b From Daumard and Furet, Structures et relations sociales, pp. 10-19.
 c Values are given in thousands of livres.
 d N is for the number of contracts.
 e V is for the value of contracts.
 Note: These figures exclude loans to Louis d'Orldans (the King's cousin, who was the client of
 notary 115 and borrowed about 5 million livres).
 masters) or wage earners-a group that formed perhaps 78 percent of
 the city's lay adult population. Of course, such a result is perhaps not
 surprising, for many artisans and wage earners lacked the collateral
 needed to get a loan in an anonymous market such as Paris.
 As could be expected, lenders also came from the ranks of the
 wealthy. In 1730 to 1788, for example, 39 percent were nobles and
 officers and 33 percent merchants, bourgeois, notaries, and financiers-
 moneyed groups far more prominent among lenders than among bor-
 rowers (Table 1). Again, artisans and wage earners were hardly in-
 volved. In a sense the credit market shifted funds within the wealthy
 elite, with a net flow from merchants, bourgeois, and financiers to the
 state and to officers and nobility-presumably not the characteristics of
 a market mobilizing capital directly for productive investment.12
 12 Borrowers from the ranks of the crafts and trade grew somewhat more prominent in the late
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 TABLE 2
 THE AGES OF BORROWERS AND LENDERS (1690-1788)
 Number of Funds French Adult
 Contracts (%) Lent (%) Population (%)a
 LENDERS
 less than 40 21 19 54.5
 40 to 59 59 47 28.5
 60 or older 19 34 17.0
 BORROWERSb
 less than 40 68 57 54.5
 40 to 59 25 25 28.5
 60 or older 7 18 17.0
 a From Henri and Blayo, "La population de la France de 1740 a 1860," pp. 101-2.
 b Louis d'Orleans, who in his twenties borrowed several million livres, was excluded from the
 borrowers' age calculation.
 Notes: The ages reported here reflect only a fraction of the 8,300 contracts we collected (20 percent
 for the lenders and 3 percent for the borrowers). The data on age came from two sources: life
 annuity contracts that mentioned the borrower's age and bibliographical dictionaries.
 Although both the typical borrower and the typical lender came from
 the elite, there was usually an enormous gap between their ages.
 Borrowers were relatively young, while lenders, not surprisingly, were
 old. Throughout our periods of calm (1690 to 1710, 1730 to 1788, and
 1807 to 1840), 68 percent of the borrowers were under 40, compared
 with an estimated 55 percent for the French adult population as a whole
 during the period from 1740 to 1789. Lenders by contrast were ancient:
 78 percent were 40 or older, versus only 45 percent of French adults
 (Table 2). What the Paris credit market apparently did was to channel
 money from wealthy older lenders to the state and to younger private
 borrowers. For the private borrowers, the market served the useful
 function of transferring money across generations: of the funds lent to
 private individuals, 81 percent came from lenders 40 or older and 57
 percent went to borrowers under 40. The credit market also shifted
 money from single women to married couples and men: widows and
 thrifty unmarried women lent to the state, to couples, and to single
 males. Overall, 23 percent of the lenders were female, and they
 provided 20 percent of the credit volume (Table 3). In private transac-
 tions, 91 percent of the money they lent went to men or married
 couples-in stark contrast to male lenders, who rarely dealt with single
 women.
 Practically none of the loans reflected transactions between members
 of the same family or relatives; in only 3.1 percent of the loans between
 individuals were borrower and lender related, even by marriage.13
 eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their growing prominence may have signaled a shift toward
 productive investment, but as yet that is not certain.
 13 The loan contracts often mentioned whether borrower and lender were related by blood or by
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 TABLE 3
 THE SEX OF BORROWERS AND LENDERS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE
 LENDERS
 BORROWERS Women (%)a Men (%) Totalb
 Women NC 24.9 75.1 389
 Vd 25.7 74.3 3,768
 Men N 23.3 76.7 4,325
 V 19.0 81.0 49,332
 Total N 1,105 3,608 4,714
 V 10,339 42,761 53,100
 a Contracts were allocated to women and men on the basis of the principal signatories. The Men
 category includes all couples, because the husband was the principal signator in those cases.
 Percentages are by row.
 b Totals are in thousands of livres.
 c N is for the number of contracts.
 d V is for the value of contracts.
 Relatives undoubtedly made loans inside the family, without having
 recourse to a notary, but the thriving Parisian credit market suggests
 that families alone could not match all the thrifty women and old men
 with all the creditworthy youths.
 Why then were young men so determined to borrow that they sought
 money outside the family? And why were women and elderly men so
 eager to lend? One obvious explanation involves the life cycle. A typical
 young man in our sample might wish to purchase a government office,
 construct a glorious new residence, or pay what was due to his siblings
 when he inherited the bulk of his parents' estate. Large expenses of that
 sort had to be confronted early in a person's career, before he had
 amassed much in the way of liquid savings. The only answer was to
 borrow, and lenders with the necessary liquid assets within the family
 might be lacking. Hence the recourse to borrowing via the family
 notary.
 As for women and older men, they had inherited and earned funds
 that they sought to invest. Their concern was to increase the estate that
 they would pass on to their children and-particularly if they had no
 offspring-to ensure themselves a comfortable old age. We can see the
 same motives at work if we look at the lender's choice of the type of
 loan. The perpetual annuity was the ideal long-term financial instrument
 to pass on to children, whereas the life annuity suited lenders more
 worried about old age. Other things being equal, unmarried women
 would presumably prefer the life annuities, because with no children
 they had no direct heirs. A test of this hunch awaits the formulation of
 marriage. Furthermore, notarial practice often revealed relationships by marriage even if they were
 not mentioned explicitly. Men, when they borrowed, frequently involved their wives in the loans;
 women, whether they borrowed or lent, were identified by their maiden name and their husband's
 name.
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 TABLE 4
 INTEREST RATES ON PERPETUAL ANNUITIES
 Proportion of Loans at
 All Loans Average Less Than 5%a Exactly 5% More than 5%
 Interest _________
 Years Nb VC Rate (%)d N (%) V (%) N (%) V (%) N (%) V (%)
 1690-1699 64 3,879e 5.01 0 0 97 95 3 5
 1700-1709 98 4,686 4.96 10 24 87 75 1 1
 1710-1719 13 3,147 5.52 0 0 53 34 47 66
 1720-1729
 1730-1739 48 7,228 4.98 2 3.2 98 96.8 0 0
 1740-1749 267 8,561 4.84 20 45 80 55 0 0
 1750-1759 310 14,660 4.92 10 27 89 72.9 1 0.1
 1760-1769 80 9,872 4.98 2.5 4.4 96 94.5 2.5 1.1
 1770-1779 40 11,137 4.74 25 38.3 75 61.7 0 0
 1780-1789 134 13,687 4.98 2.2 3.4 97 %.6 0 0
 a Exactly 5 percent was defined as more than 4.9 percent and less than 5.1 percent. Before 1789
 payments on rentes were stipulated as a denier (ratio of capital to interest) rather than as an interest
 rate. Thus 5 percent corresponds to the denier 20; our slightly wider bounds cover about half the
 distance to the deniers 19 and 21.
 b N is for the number of contracts.
 c V is for the value of contracts.
 d The averages are unweighted.
 e Total loan figures are in thousands of livres.
 a precise and rather complicated econometric model of the choice of the
 type of loan, but preliminary results suggest that unmarried women
 were indeed more likely to invest in life annuities (and thus insure their
 old age) than in perpetual annuities.
 The interest charged to private parties on the perpetual annuities-the
 one credit instrument that consistently mentioned the rate-averaged
 close to 5 percent, except in the decade of 1710 to 1719 (Table 4). As 5
 percent was normally the usury limit, one might suppose that it was
 merely a legal subterfuge, the true interest rates charged on the private
 rentes being higher. Yet why then were the average rates usually just
 below 5 percent? And why do we nearly always encounter a range of
 interest rates? The rates certainly tended to cluster near 5 percent, but
 a number of the private rentes paid interest below 5 percent. It seems
 unlikely that lenders would trouble themselves to specify a rate below 5
 percent if the true rate were actually higher. And if the 5 percent
 limit were merely a charade, it would be hard to explain why an
 attempt to lower it to 4 percent in 1766 swiftly caused the supply of
 perpetual annuities to dry up, forcing a return to the old limit of 5
 percent by 1770.14
 The consequences of that ill-fated attempt to lower the usury limit
 suggests that market rates on most private rentes were at the 5 percent
 limit, and below the limit on certain favored loans. The spread we
 14 Guyot, s.v. "intdrets."
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 observe in interest rates points to a similar story. The interest rates
 below 5 percent were reserved for the best credit risks: individuals
 whose collateral and likelihood of repayment inspired great confidence.
 In the words of one eighteenth-century legal manual, rentes yielding 4
 instead of 5 percent "are used and in fact a number of them have been
 created simply because the borrower was creditworthy and had fur-
 nished good collateral to secure the rente." 15 Such rates were nonethe-
 less relatively rare-at least in Paris. Outside the city, by contrast, the
 spread of interest rates was typically much broader. The reason, we
 surmise, reflected the difficulty of assessing creditworthiness inside the
 city. In a village or town, the lender would know his borrower and his
 borrower's assets. He would learn if property had already been pledged
 to another lender and he could charge the creditworthy borrower a low
 interest rate.16 How much more difficult it was to make a similar
 assessment in Paris. How did one judge the value of collateral when it
 was, for example, land lying far outside the city? How did one tell
 whether it already secured other loans?
 Such problems were far from theoretical. Contemporaries knew well
 the risks of loans backed by overburdened collateral. The monarchy,
 which used the value of private offices to secure loans to the govern-
 ment, reassured creditors by developing a lien registry that kept tract of
 all the claims on offices by lenders. The registry made it difficult to
 stretch the office collateral thin, but the equivalent institution for private
 loans-an effective land registry-was not functioning before the nine-
 teenth century. In such a situation, unscrupulous borrowers could
 pledge the same collateral over and over again to different lenders.17
 It is no wonder then that most borrowers who had recourse to rentes
 under the Old Regime were simply charged the highest rate that the law
 would allow-5 percent. Riskless rates may have been a bit below 5
 percent, but only a minority of borrowers merited such confidence. The
 vast majority either paid 5 percent or were given no rente at all. If a
 private borrower were refused a rente, his only recourse (assuming that
 he possessed enough collateral to borrow at all) would typically be an
 obligation. 18 The hidden interest on the obligation could exceed 5
 percent, which might induce lenders to grant a risky loan. The attempt
 to lower the interest rate ceiling on rentes in 1766 in fact provides
 evidence that the obligations served to make loans at interest rates
 Is Guyot, s.v. "rente."
 16 Rosenthal, "A Credit Market in Old-Regime France."
 17 Bien, "Les offices, les corps et le credit d'etat." First steps toward a land registry were taken
 in the late eighteenth century, but the registry was not really effective until the 1800s.
 18 Some private borrowers, such as the duc d'Orlgans, issued life annuities, but the uncertainties
 regarding the life span of a small group of lenders would make such borrowing too risky for most
 private borrowers. It is worth noting that the choice of loan type was further complicated by the
 fact that lenders and borrowers could agree to shift the burden of the taxes on certain loan
 revenues.
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 FIGURE 1
 PRIVATE CREDIT INSTRUMENTS IN PARIS, 1760-1773
 Note: Etude 115 was excluded because of the enormous sums raised by Louis d'Orldans in certain
 months. Including etude 115 does not change the qualitative results, but it obscures the graph.
 above those prevailing on renters. Immediately after the legal rate was
 reduced to 4 percent, the number of rentes recorded in our etudes fell,
 while obligations jumped (Figure 1). At 4 percent, few borrowers had
 the impeccable collateral needed to borrow via rentes; most were
 shunted off to the more expensive realm of the obligations or denied
 credit altogether.
 Was there no way for lenders to distinguish between borrowers
 before the creation of the land registry in the nineteenth century? How
 did they single out the creditworthy parties and offer them rentes
 (perhaps even at rates below 5 percent) rather than obligations at what
 were presumably higher rates of interest? Certain borrowers might of
 course have distinguished themselves by their lofty position in Old
 Regime society: that was particularly likely for the elite of nobles and
 officeholders, who were not only wealthy but possessed considerable
 real property to offer as collateral. Such creditworthy debtors would
 presumably have found it much easier than others to borrow via rentes
 rather than via obligations, with their potentially higher interest rates.
 Other borrowers might have invoked a local reputation for trust, which
 might have swayed lenders living in the same neighborhood. Alterna-
 tively, professional contacts could provide information about borrow-
 ers: recall wigmaker Pierre Quiet, who borrowed 2,000 livres from
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 another wigmaker, Benoit Caldero. If local reputation and professional
 contacts were a reliable source of information, then rentes ought to have
 been more common than obligations when both borrower and lender
 were from the same neighborhood or profession. Repeat dealings in the
 credit market might also demonstrate that a borrower was reliable: if so,
 repeat borrowers should utilize rentes too.
 Testing these ideas also awaits the formulation of a precise econo-
 metric model, but preliminary results suggest that only membership in
 the elite conveyed much information about borrowers, and then only
 under the Old Regime, when the defining characteristics of the elite-
 nobility and possession of a government office-were reliable indicators
 of wealth and collateral. None of the other sources of information
 apparently revealed much about a borrower's credit rating. Professional
 contacts, it appears, told little about a borrower's solvency, and
 neighborhood reputations, if they mattered at all, must have operated
 on a scale much smaller than that of the parish. Similarly, repeat
 dealings seem of little import-hardly a surprise in a city as large as
 Paris, where lenders could scarcely know a borrower's past.
 Perhaps the best information about the borrowers came from the
 notaries. The notaries, after all, knew the intimate details of the
 borrower's financial dealings, for borrowers and their families typically
 remained with the same notary for years. Notaries had every reason to
 evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrowers carefully: a mistake
 would offend a lender and make him take his family's business else-
 where. Although lenders occasionally switched etudes, they did so
 rarely, which suggests that notaries performed their task well. In the
 privacy of their etudes and without leaving any records, they undoubt-
 edly steered the trustworthy borrowers toward rentes perpetuelles and
 larger loans. The efficacy of the notaries may in turn explain why
 neighborhood reputations, professional contacts, or repeat dealings
 shed so little light on a borrower's solvency. Such information paled to
 insignificance beside what the notary knew: the borrower's assets, his
 financial history, and so on. It thus revealed far less about a borrower's
 credit than the notary's opinion did.
 The private credit market was of course affected by other forces that
 we have not yet considered. Inflation in the late eighteenth century, for
 example, pushed up nominal interest rates against the 5 percent legal
 ceiling and made obligations all the more attractive to lenders. After all,
 interest on them could exceed the 5 percent limit, and they offered the
 lender greater protection at a time of rising nominal rates. It is not
 surprising, therefore, that money shifted out of rentes and into obliga-
 tions at the end of the eighteenth century-a precursor of a trend that
 would continue after 1800. The private credit market was also buffeted
 by government borrowing, which competed for private capital.19 But
 that is a subject for another article: one that examines not only the
 9 See Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal, "Private and Public Credit Markets in Paris."
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 evidence for crowding out in the eighteenth century but also the legacy
 of government actions 100 years later.
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